CIA FILES ONLINE : IranList of interesting CIA files on IRANInteresting CIA analysis on post-Khomaini Iran. From potential internal struggle and the importance of Revolutionary Guard "...we do not see any likely alternatives to an Islamic-oriented regime with a strong clerical influence in the aftermath of Khomeni's death. In our judgment, neither the Shas's son nor any other Iranian exile leader possesses the domestic assets to gain control...." IRAN: GROWING PROSPECTS FOR INSTABILITY CIA predicted fall of Saddam will follow with Pro Iran Shia regime: "A major defeat of the Iraqi army could trigger a series of events possibly leading to the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and his replacement by a fundamentalis Shia regime controlled by Tehran....USSR, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Israel oppose the creation of a pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad, but none is likely to be able to act quickly or effectively enough to prevent such an outcome." ONSEQUENCES OF AN IRANIAN BREAKTHROUGH AT AL BASRAH Transcript from a bugged meeting at Mainz Germany in 1986 between Oliver North and Iranians negotiating the exchange of hostages from Lebanon for arms.Page 8: North: This is why I asked you earlier, when we get the hostages out, do you want our president or somebody else, like Shultz, to say nice things about Iran? North:...I will tell you right now, if you recall the plan that we put into motion after our last meeting, if that does not proceed as we all agreed then I am finished. And Shultz will find some other way and he has his people in touch with Iranians and he will proceed in that direction. And there will be no more assistance. Page 10: Talking about how North will become the scapegoat and take the blame: secord: And if we fail we're going to shoot him, because somebody has to go. Like in Iran. Somebody has to be shot. Talking about who controls Iran Hakim: (inteprets) He says you have to understand that Iran just finished and setting Imam Khomeini aside, the country is managed by shareholding, and once you put khomeini aside, there are unmber of people involved. Hakim: (inteprets) There are three basic groups of this shareholding company. They are minor shareholders. One is the Radicals and they are (word missed) radical and (word missed) within the (hard to read). Then the thrid group is the righ-wing. And then there's two (few owrds missed) who is headed by Hashemi Rafanjani and not only do they follow their own line but they are also the connection between the first and third group. Page 142: North:...His[Ronald Reagan] vision is that when he leaves office in 1989 we will have full diplomatic relations between your country and ours. Page 143: North: If it became known what we are giving you...what we are giving you shows some significant vulnerabilities on their part....If it ever became known we have done this, we would be finished in trms of credibility as long as president Reagan is president. page 151: North: ...You tell us who you want our agent to be. We will go and find a person in the company that makes these things[meaning weapon parts] and say, we are going to turn a blind eye... Page 159: Cave: This Koran is in exchange for the Bible that they have Received and it has a passage that brother Samii and He's paraing for the day that the real officals of the two countries will exchange such gifts. Page 160: North: some day wnen I am an old man I will be able to tell my grandchildren that those two young men who are now running the Islamic Republic of Iran, I knew them when they were younger men.... ((Iranians still in room and are whispering. They are apparently aware that the room is bugged. Conversations are inaudible.)) Page 161: North: I'll tell you what bothers me. The German security service is all over her. Page 166: North: We need to be able to assure Arab government that they are not threatened by the Islamic Revolutionary Government of Iran. North: How can we do that if we can't tell them we are talking to you? In comparison to Saddam Husayn's regime North: Quite frankly we would much rather have diplomatic relations with your country. But we all in this room recognize we are not going be able...Neither you nor we can do that tomorrow. Page 168: North: He [meaning Ronald Reagan] went off one whole weekend and prayed about what the answer should be. And he came back almost a year ago with that passage I gave you that he wrote in front of the Bible I gave you. MEETING AT MAINZ, W. GERMANY, 29-30 OCT. 1986 Detailed CIA & SIS overthrow of Mossadeq from cryptome.org "Unrest in the Iranian military appears to be growing as senior officers become increasingly disenchanged with Ayatollah Khomeini...." "A succesful coup appears unlikely at present, but dissident officers could try to kill Khomeini, hoping that chaos would ensue and bring down the regime." IRAN: UNREST IN THE MILITARY "The Hiballah leadership, shocked by the Khatami vicotry, scrambled to ensure that his election would not diminish Iran's support for Hizballah." HIZBALLAH REACTIONS TO KHATAMI'S ELECTION "...Iran still seeks recognition as a regional power...pursue a primarily diplomatic strategy to assert its regional influence, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council...seek to shape postwar relations in the Gulf in ways that emphasize Iranian leadership, isolate Iraq...to take advantage of...the declining Soviet involvement in Afghanistan....Iran is disadvantage in this effort...most traditional Sunni Muslims probably will look more favorably on the more orthodox-and wealthier-Saudis." "Tehran is working to oust Saddam Husayn from power, in hopes of replacing him with a weaker government more susceptible to Iranian influence....Tehran would like to see a Shia dominated regime take power in Baghdad...." IRAN UNDER RAFSANJANI: SEEKING A NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY "Iraq probably would further improve its relations with the United States as it looked to rebuild its economy after the war." "...Moscow might worry that the absense of the unifying factor of the war could weaken the present fundamentalist regime and bring in more pragmatic clerics, who might not be as averse to dealing with the United States." in case of "A Marked Expansion of the War Between Iran and Iraq" (p 73) "The Sovites in our view, also would not want either Iran or Iraq to emerge as a clear vitor....If either state gained predominance, it would make it more difficult for the USSR to exert influence in the Persian Gulf region." SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST A conservative government probably could not reverse the oil nationalization because of popular sentiment....probably could not immediately attempt to reach a settlement with the British on terms more favorable than Mossadeq has offered. comment on the Iranian situation IRAN UNDER RAFSANJANI: SEEKING A NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY IRAN-IRAQ: RENEWED RIVALRY CIA's list of Iranian officials both in IRI and outside. DIRECTORY OF IRANIAN OFFICIALS Document detailing power and control on Iran. In face of Shah's death, British control, potential control by Tudeh and Ultra-nationalist groups, Zahedi's ability and more through 1950s. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN THROUGH 1955 Document listed under Iran Coup illustrating CIA's close watch of the Tudeh party TUDEH PARTY WEEKLY INSTRUCTIONS Document showing west favoried Mossadeq over Kashani "If Kashani should come to power, the porbable net result in Iran would be a situation worse for Western interests than the current one[meaning MOSSADEQ]" PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF MOSSADEQ REGIME IN IRAN "Although Mossadeq will probably continue to seek US aid to enable him to meet his budgetary deficit--which would make it easier for him to stand firm on his onw temrs for an oil settlement and would temporarily strengthen his political position--it is increasingly clear that he opposes the development of closer military and political ties with the West." PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMEN "Mohammad Mossadeq...is also an impractical visionary and a poor administrator, it is unlikely that he will do very much to solve the country's critical economic and social problems." CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (1951) "The Shah has taken a stand in favor of Mossadeq and at left since 17 September has refused to listen to British entreaties to rally opposition in favor of Seyed Zia Tabatabai. At Mossadeq's request the Shah has ordered the princess Ashraf out of country (she left in late September 1951), thereby showing that he would no longer (that is, for the time being) condone court intrigues in political matters." "The influence of the British Embassy upon the Shah and his courtiers has practically ceased to exist, mainly because the Shah is increasingly aware of the strength of the "streets", and fears the "streets" at present more than he fears the British. No other Prime Minister prior to Mossadeq could claim such sponsorship. The Shah dares not talk back or step out of line...." ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION (1951) THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN (1948 Ahmad Ghavam or Qavam el-Saltaneh) |
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